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THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE IN DEVELOPER-CONTROLLED 





Depending upon one’s point of view, Florida Community Development 
Districts (“districts”) either contribute to marginal, undesirable development
1
 or are 
the best way to manage growth in Florida.
2
 That debate will probably continue to 
rage.  However, the scope of this article is not to question whether districts are 
either a positive or a negative for growth management, but rather to discuss their 
potential for abuse and mismanagement on the part of the developers that control 
them through the developer elected boards of supervisors (boards).  This article 
will discuss the various statutes that control both the districts and their respective 
boards. In addition, this article will recommend changes to certain sections of those 
statutes to better protect the residents, who are subject to the districts’ control, from 
developers who put profit and personal gain above the best interests of the districts 
they control and the districts’ residents, who have little or no recourse in 
challenging decisions of the developer controlled boards.  
Most homebuyers who purchase homesites located in developments with an 
established district are ignorant of what a district is, much less what a district is 
authorized to do, even though homebuyers are provided with documents which 
require disclosure.
3
 For example, homebuyers may not be aware that they are 
potentially paying twice for projects and infrastructure within the district. A district 
is authorized to issue bonds, which may be, and generally are, secured by the land 
within its boundaries.
4
 Those bonds may attach to each separate parcel based upon 
its size.
5
 The larger the parcel, the greater the debt.
6
 The parcels can be either 
undeveloped or platted and developed.
7
 When individual lots are sold to 
 ________________________  
 * Professor of Justice Studies, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Myers, Florida. J.D., University of 
Miami School of Law. M.B.A. and B.A., University of South Florida. The author is a practicing attorney with 
nineteen years of experience in the following areas: corporate and business law; taxation; contract preparation and 
review; estate planning; and small business consulting. 
 1. Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Infrastructure and the Law: Florida’s Past, Present and Future, 23 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 450 (2008) (citing Thomas J. Wilkes, Jr., The Delusion That Tax-Exempt Financing 
for Developers Improves Growth Management, 10 FLA. ENVTL. & URBAN ISSUES 8 (1983)). 
 2. Id. (citing Ken van Assenderp, Community Development Districts: An Alternative Way for the Private 
and Public Sectors to Enhance Growth Management, 11 FLA. ENVTL. & URBAN ISSUES 14 (1983)). 
 3. Michael Van Sickler & Janet Zink, The Hidden Costs of Living, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 12, 
2003), http://www.sptimes.com/2003/12/12/Northoftampa/The_hidden_costs_of_l.shtml. 
 4. FLA. STAT. § 190.011(9) (2009); FLA. STAT. § 190.016 (2009). 
 5. See FLA. STAT. § 190.016(1). 
 6. FLA. STAT. § 190.016(2); FLA. STAT. § 190.003(8)(f) (2009). 
 7. See FLA. STAT. § 190.012 (2009). 
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homeowners, those homeowners assume the balance of the principal on their 
portion of the total bond issue.
8




As previously stated, the proceeds from the bond issue pay for projects in the 
district, including the infrastructure (such as water and sewer), underground 
utilities, as well as golf courses and other amenities.
10
 These are major selling 
points to potential homebuyers, and the premium added to the cost of their 
homesite reflects the value of the amenities and infrastructure.
11
 That supports the 
argument that homebuyers are paying for those improvements twice—once in the 
premium on the purchase price of their homesite, and twice when homebuyers 
assume and repay their portion of the bond issue, which is secured by their 
property. Residents also pay for the annual maintenance costs of the district, 
through either assessments or ad valorem taxes.
12
 The amount of those assessments 
or taxes is determined by a five-member board of supervisors, which is comprised 
initially of either owners or employees of the developer.
13
 
Ignorance about what a district is and what it can and cannot do is not always 
bliss, as some homebuyers have discovered.
14
 There is little to no risk on the 
developer with the establishment of a district, since homeowners would ultimately 
be responsible for any miscalculations.
15
 That is one reason why districts have 
become increasingly popular as a development mechanism in Florida.
16
 
I.  ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS 
Community Development Districts were created under the Uniform 
Community Development District Act of 1980, chapter 190, Florida Statutes, 
which provided a uniform procedure, under general law, to establish an 
independent special district as an alternative method to finance and manage basic 
services for community development.
17
 The statute also provided for the operation, 
exercise of power, and termination procedure for the district.
18
 While amended 




 ________________________  
 8. FLA. STAT. § 190.016(1)(b), (5). 
 9. FLA. STAT. § 190.036 (1980). 
 10. FLA. STAT. § 190.012(1)(a)–(b), (2)(a) (2009). 
 11. Eran Ben-Joseph, Land Use and Design Innovations in Private Communities, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF 
LAND POLICY, LAND LINES ARTICLE, Vol. 16 No. 4 (Oct. 2004), http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/971_Land-Use-
and-Design-Innovations-in-Private-Communities. 
 12. FLA. STAT. § 190.021(1)–(2) (2009). 
 13. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(1)–(2)(a) (2009). 
 14. Van Sickler & Zink, supra note 3. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. FLA. STAT. § 190.002(3) (1980). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Henry Kenza van Assenderp & Andrew Ignatius Solis, Dispelling the Myths: Florida’s Non-Ad 
Valorem Special Assessments Law, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 823, 827 (1993). 
2
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/1
Fall 2013 The Potential for Abuse 3 
 
Which governmental entity approves a new district depends on the number of 
acres included within its boundaries.
20
 The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory 
Commission has the authority to grant a petition for the establishment of a district 
if the number of acres equals or exceeds 1,000.
21
 If the total acreage is less than 
1,000, the county commission of the county that has jurisdiction over the majority 
of the land in the area where the district will be located, grants the petition for its 
establishment.
22
 On the other hand, if all of the land in the area of the proposed 
district is within the boundaries of a municipal corporation, the municipal 
corporation assumes the duties of the county commission and grants the petition.
23
  
However, if all of the land is within the territorial jurisdiction of two or more 
municipalities, even if less than 1,000 acres, the petition for the creation of the 




The petition requesting the establishment of the district must include the 
designation of five persons who would serve as the initial members of the district’s 
board of supervisors until replaced by elected members.
25
 Initially, the term 
“elected members” is somewhat of a misnomer, since the board members are 
elected by the landowners, i.e. the developer, and will not be elected by the 
residents of the district for several years.
26
 Therein lies the primary area for 
concern. 
II.  BOARDS OF SUPERVISORS 
A meeting of the landowners of the district is required within ninety days 
following the establishment of the district for the purpose of electing five 
supervisors to the Community Development District Board of Supervisors.
27
 Each 
landowner is then permitted to cast one vote per acre of land owned by the 
landowner within the district for each available elected position.
28
 Of course, the 
developer will initially own most of the land.
29
 Therefore, the developer will have 
the most votes to cast, essentially electing the entire board.
30
 
However, if the initial board chooses to exercise its ad valorem taxing power, 
authorized by section 190.021, Florida Statutes, it must call an election in which 
the members of the board will be elected by qualified electors of the district.
31
 In 
 ________________________  
 20. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(a)1–2 (2012). 
 21. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1). 
 22. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(2). 
 23. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(2)(e). 
 24. Id. 
 25. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(a)3. 
 26. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 190.006(1) (2009). 
 27. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(2)(a). 
 28. FLA. STAT. §190.006(2)(b). 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See FLA. STAT § 189.4051(1)(a) (1997). 
(1)  Definitions—As used in this section: 
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addition, all elected board members must themselves be qualified electors of the 
district.
32
 That election would then be held in conjunction with a primary or general 
election unless the district bears the cost of the election.
33
  
Choosing to assess ad valorem taxes means that the developer, the initial 
landowner, could lose control of the district to those who may not have the best 
interests of the developer in mind.
34
 Consequently, it would be to the advantage of 
the developer to choose not to assess ad valorem taxes, but instead to assess non-ad 
valorem annual charges for the district’s operating expenses.
35
  
Eventually, regardless of whether a district decided to levy ad valorem taxes, 
the qualified electors of the district will have the opportunity to elect the board of 
supervisors for the district.
36
 When the election occurs depends on the total number 
of acres within the district and how long the district has been in existence.
37
 Section 
190.006(3)(a)(2)(a), Florida Statutes, states: 
[C]ommencing [six] years after the initial appointment of members 
or, for a district exceeding 5,000 acres in area or for a compact, 
urban, mixed-use district, [ten] years after the initial appointment 
of members, the position of each member whose term has expired 
shall be filled by a qualified elector of the district, elected by 
qualified electors of the district.
38
 
However, there is a caveat to this section. Members of the board shall continue 
to be elected by landowners if, 
in the [sixth] year after the initial appointment of members, or [ten] 
years after such initial appointment for districts exceeding 5,000 
acres in area or for a compact, urban, mixed-use district, there are 
not at least 250 qualified electors in the district, or for a district 
exceeding 5,000 acres or for a compact, urban, mixed-use district, 





sixth or tenth year, when a district reaches 250 or 500 qualified 
electors, respectively, the positions of two of the five landowner elected board 
  
(a) ”Qualified elector” means any person at least 18 years of age who is a citizen of the 
United States, a permanent resident of Florida, and a freeholder or freeholder’s spouse and 
resident of the district who registers with the supervisor of elections of a county within 
which the district lands are located when the registration books are open. 
Id. 
 32. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)1 (2009). 
 33. Id. 
 34. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)2a. 
 35. See FLA. STAT. §190.021(3) (2009). 
 36. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)2a. 
 37. Id. 
 38. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)2a (2009). 
 39. Id. 
4
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/1
Fall 2013 The Potential for Abuse 5 
 
members, whose terms are set to expire, must be filled by qualified electors of the 
district, elected by qualified electors of the district.
40
 The landowner elected 
member whose term is expiring shall continue to be elected by the landowners.
41
 
As terms expire after the first election at which qualified electors of the district are 
elected, members of the board must be qualified electors of the district, and will be 
elected by qualified electors of the district.
42
 
The number of qualified electors is determined by the supervisor of elections 
of the county in which the district is located on or before the first of June each 
year.
43
 Official records of the county property appraiser and tax collector are also 
used in making the determination.
44
 Elections are nonpartisan and must be 
conducted in the same manner prescribed by law for holding general elections.
45
 
The newly elected board members will assume office on the second Tuesday 
following the general election.
46
 That does not necessarily mean that the newly 
elected board members will meet on that day or even within the next couple of 
months,
47
 because the statute does not mandate that a meeting be held on the 
second Tuesday following the election.
48
 The statute simply states, “As soon as 
practicable after each election or appointment, the board shall organize . . . .”
49
  
For the first few years following the grant of the petition to establish a district, 
the landowner, or developer “elects” the members of the board.
50
 Even though the 
required number of years has passed and the number of qualified electors reaches 
the minimum number for the election of board members by qualified electors, the 
developer will continue to control the board for two more years, since the 
developer will have elected three of the five members.
51
 Consequently, the 
developer will control the actions of the board for at least eight or twelve years, 
depending upon the size of the district.
52
 Some would argue that the developer does 
not control the board, since it is an elected body and must make decisions 
independent of the developer.
53
 It suffices to say, those people need a “reality 
check.” 
Adding to the possible manipulation of the district by the developer-controlled 
board is how the Florida statutes have exempted members of those boards from 
ethical requirements to which other elected officials are bound.
54
 Section 
190.007(1), Florida Statutes, states: “It shall not be a conflict of interest under 
 ________________________  
 40. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)2b. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)2d. 
 44. Id. 
 45. FLA. STAT. §190.006(3)(b). 
 46. Id. 
 47. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(6). 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
 50. See FLA. STAT. § 190.006(2)(a). 
 51. See FLA. STAT. § 190.006(2)(b). 
 52. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)2a. 
 53. See FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(a)3 (2012); see FLA. STAT. § 190.007(1) (2007). 
 54. See FLA. STAT. § 190.007(1). 
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chapter 112 for a board member or the district manager or another employee of the 
district to be a stockholder, officer, or employee of a landowner or of an entity 
affiliated with a landowner.”
55
 This section is unambiguous. The Florida 
Legislature made it perfectly clear that a stockholder, officer, employee, or other 
entity affiliated with a development company could also be a board member of a 
community development district.
56
 In other words, the statute allows the developer 
to stack the deck in his favor and initially “elect” all five board members.
57
 
However, section 190.007(1), Florida Statutes, is not specific about “voting” 
conflicts of interest.
58
 Instead it refers the reader to chapter 112, Florida Statutes, 
which governs public officers and employees.
59
 Section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida 
Statutes, specifically deals with voting conflicts.
60
 Since board members are either 




Section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes,
62
 is very clear; it forbids any county, 
municipal, or other local public officer from voting in an official capacity on any 
matter that would “inure to his or her special private gain or loss,” or on one which 
would inure to the private gain or loss of any employer or parent organization or 
subsidiary of a corporation that employs him or her,
63
 with certain exceptions 
spelled out in section 112.312(2), Florida Statutes.
64
 One can obviously conclude 
that section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes, includes any individuals with a 
percentage ownership in the development company.
65
 
However, the Legislature saw fit to add an exception to section 112.3143(3)(a), 
Florida Statutes, in section 112.3143(3)(b) which states: “However, a 
commissioner of a community redevelopment agency created or designated 
pursuant to [section] 163.356 or [section] 163.357, or an officer of an independent 
special tax district elected on a one-acre, one-vote basis is not prohibited from 
voting, when voting in said capacity [emphasis added].”
66
 This exception is a 
tremendous concession to developers, one which has caused the most problems, 




 ________________________  
 55. FLA. STAT. § 190.007(1). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 112 (2013). 
 60. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(3)(a) (2013). 
 61. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(1)(b). 
 62. FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(3)(a). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 112.312(2) (2013). 
 65. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(3)(a). 
 66. FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(3)(b). 
 67. FLA. STAT. § 112.311(6) (2013). 
It is declared to be the policy of the state that public officers and employees, state and local, 
are agents of the people and hold their positions for the benefit of the public. They are 
bound to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the State Constitution and to 
perform efficiently and faithfully their duties under the laws of the federal, state, and local 
governments. Such officers and employees are bound to observe, in their official acts, the 
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The State of Florida saw the potential for abuse when it challenged section 
190.006, Florida Statutes, by claiming the statute was a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, since it allowed voting on a one-vote-per-acre basis instead of a 
one-person, one-vote basis.
68
 In State v. Frontier Acres Community Development 
District Pasco County,
 
 the State argued that “the powers granted special districts 
created under the authority of chapter 190 . . . invoke the equal protection 
requirement of one-person, one-vote as established in Reynolds v. Sims.”
 69
 In 
Reynolds, “the United States Supreme Court held that the [E]qual [P]rotection 




The United States Supreme Court extended the one-person, one-vote principle 
to state political subdivisions that exercised general governmental functions.
71
 In 
Hadley v. Junior College District, the Court held that even though the powers 
exercised by the Junior College District were not as broad as those held by the 
county commissioners, the powers were general enough to apply the one-person, 
one-vote principle.
72
 However, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with Frontier 
Acres when it claimed that Reynolds does not apply to special districts created 
under chapter 190, since those districts “do not exercise the general governmental 
functions contemplated by Reynolds.”
73
 In addition, Frontier Acres emphasized the 
limited powers granted to it under chapter 190 and furthermore, the 
“disproportionate effect district operations have on landowners.”
74
 The Florida 
Supreme Court continued by stating:  
A community development district created under chapter 190 does 
not exercise general governmental functions. Its activities, 
however, have a disproportionate effect upon the landowners of 
the district because they are the ones who must bear the initial 
burden of the district’s costs. Under these circumstances, it is 
reasonable for the Florida [L]egislature to have concluded that 
these landowners, to the exclusion of other residents [emphasis 
added], should initially elect the board of supervisors. We 
therefore conclude that nothing in the equal protection clause 
precludes the [L]egislature from limiting the voting for the board 
  
highest standards of ethics consistent with this code and the advisory opinions rendered with 
respect hereto regardless of personal considerations, recognizing that promoting the public 
interest and maintaining the respect of the people in their government must be of foremost 
concern. 
Id. 
 68. State v. Frontier Acres Cmty. Dev. Dist. Pasco Cnty., 472 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. 1985). 
 69. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1970). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 456. 
 74. Id. 
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The initial burden the court mentioned is either the assessments or the ad 
valorem taxes imposed on the developer’s property included in the district.
76
 Of 
course, until a developer sells the property within the development, the developer 
must pay the assessments or ad valorem taxes imposed on that property.
77
 The 
developer chooses that risk.
78
 However, the developer will also reap the benefits 
when it sells the property to those who may not be fully aware of what a developer-
controlled district can and cannot do during the time the developer unilaterally 
controls the district.
79
 Nevertheless, that is no justification for why home buyers 
should be unprotected. 
Legislatures make mistakes when passing legislation that favors one interest 
over another, especially when that legislation does not protect the parties who may 
eventually bear the burden of bad law. It is an entirely different matter when courts 
ratify those mistakes. Unfortunately, when courts render bad opinions, they 
sometimes use language that demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the 
major problems that could arise as a result of their decisions. Those who “merely 
reside in the district”
80
 are those who have invested in the community, and will be 
there long after the developer has departed. These residents must then bear the 
burden of the unprincipled developers who poorly managed the district, leaving the 
residents to pick up the pieces.
81
 
The following sections will discuss the potential areas of abuse in developer-
controlled districts, followed by recommended changes to the statutes that would 
help alleviate the problems of abuse. 
III.  ELECTIONS OF SUPERVISORS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS 
The primary problem is how the initial board members are chosen. It goes 
without saying that any changes in the selection process will be a major shift in 
policy, and it is unclear whether the Legislature has the motivation to make that 
shift, especially with the powerful building industry ready to pounce on any 
legislation that might weaken their hand in the high stakes game of land 
development. 
As previously stated, section 190.006, Florida Statutes, details how board 
members are elected, both initially and when control gradually shifts to the 
residents.
82
 A relatively easy fix to most of the problems caused by developer-
controlled boards—and the one problem that would cause the most consternation 
 ________________________  
 75. Id. at 457. 
 76. See FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)1. 
 77. See FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 457. 
 81. See FLA. STAT. § 720.303(1) (2013). 
 82. FLA. STAT. § 190.006. 
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for developers—would be to have the county commissioners, or city council 
members if the district is located within a municipality, appoint three members of 
the initial board. Those members would be appointed by the commissioner or 
council members in whose constituency the district is located. The appointed 
members would be required to be residents of that commission or council 
constituency, and therefore, would have a vested interest in ensuring that the 
district does what is in the best interests of the residents living within the district, as 
well as the surrounding communities. The appointed members, of course, would be 
subject to the same laws and ethics rules as those who are elected.
83
 Such a change 
would remove control of the district from the developer and place it in the hands of 
those whose only obligation is to the district and its constituents, not to the 
developer. 
IV.  FLORIDA’S GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE LAW 
The fact that the initial board of supervisors is comprised of both owners and 
employees of the developer adds another dimension to the problem, violations of 
Florida’s Sunshine Law.
84
  Florida’s Sunshine Law, Section 286.011(1), Florida 
Statutes, prohibits discussion among board members about matters that could come 
before the board for a vote.
85
 The penalty for knowingly violating the statute is a 
misdemeanor of the second degree.
86
  
The reality is that since many board members who were elected by the 
developer also work together, most likely in the same office, the probability that 
they are discussing board business when they are outside of public meetings is 
high, especially when one of the board members, the chairman in all likelihood, 
employs and supervises the others. Unfortunately for the public, but fortunately for 
those who violate the statute, Sunshine Law violations are very difficult to prove. 
They generally require one of the participants to report the others, which is highly 
unlikely in this situation.
87
  Consequently, potential violations of the Florida 
Sunshine Law would be minimized by the appointment of three of the five board 
members. 
There are other changes to the Florida Statutes that would provide district 
residents with some assurance that their interests are being protected. Those 
changes, while less drastic than removing the developer from control of the board 
through the appointment of three of the five members, would still eliminate some 
of the discretion that the boards now have in managing their respective districts. 
District boards have a great deal of flexibility in setting district policies, as 
long as those policies do not violate any Florida Statutes.
88
 Removing some of that 
flexibility, while leaving control of the districts in the hands of the developers, may 
 ________________________  
 83. See FLA. STAT. § 112.311(6) (2013). 
 84. FLA. STAT. § 190.006; FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (2012)  (commonly referred to as the Sunshine Law). 
 85. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1). 
 86. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(3)(b). 
 87. See FLA. STAT. § 286.011. 
 88. See FLA. STAT. § 190. 
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be more palatable to the Legislature, if and when the Legislature considers changes 
to chapter 190, Florida Statutes.
89
 
The following suggestions for changes to chapter 190, Florida Statutes, will 
not have much impact as long as the landowner/developer elects all members of the 
board. However, the changes will have some significance once section 190.006, 
Florida Statutes,
90
—which addresses the transition of control of the district from 
the developer to the residents—begins to take effect. 
V.  DISTRICT BOARD MEETINGS 
Section 190.006(3)(b), Florida Statutes, states: “Board members shall 
[emphasis added] assume the office on the second Tuesday following their 
election.”
91
 However, the statute does not mandate that a meeting be held on that 
date.
92
 The statute that addresses a meeting is section 190.006(6), Florida Statutes, 
which provides that, “[a]s soon as practicable after each election or appointment, 
the board shall organize by electing one of its members as chair and by electing a 
secretary, who need not be a member of the board, and such other officers as the 
board may deem necessary.”
93
  
The problematic language in that section is “[a]s soon as practicable . . . .”
94
 It 
does not mandate that a meeting be held by a specific date.
95
 Therefore, it allows 
for a great deal of manipulation, especially if a policy has been previously adopted 
by the board, giving the chairman sole authority for calling meetings. The 
developer-controlled boards may delay that meeting, as some boards may not 
appreciate the fact that they must now share decision-making authority with 
residents, or make certain matters public that they wished to keep out of the public 
arena. 
Furthermore, in addition to granting the chairman sole authority for calling 
meetings, board policy may also permit the chairman to make other decisions 
without board approval, such as executing documents, dealing with vendors, 
approving contracts, and other actions. That, of course, destroys the transparency 
with which a public board should operate. One fix for that problem would be to 
amend section 190.006(6), Florida Statutes, by deleting the language, “[a]s soon as 
practicable . . . .”
96
 and replacing it with, “[w]ithin three weeks . . . .” Therefore, 
section 190.006(6), Florida Statutes, would read, in its entirety: “[No later than 
three weeks following each election or appointment,] the board shall organize by 
electing one of its members as chair and by electing a secretary, who need not be a 
member of the board, and such other officers as the board may deem necessary.”
97
 
 ________________________  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 190.006 (2009). 
 91. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(b). 
 92. See id. 
 93. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(6). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
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That change would give the board one additional week following the election to 
hold its organizational meeting.
98
 While the resident members would still be in the 
minority, that change would eliminate the potential for manipulation by developer-
controlled boards by keeping the resident members from having any input in board 
business for an extended period of time following an election. 
However, there is still a possibility that the developer-controlled board could 
keep the resident members from having input into board business by adopting a 
board policy that gives the chairman the authority to both call all meetings and to 
cancel previously scheduled meetings. For example, even though an organizational 
meeting was mandated, the chairman could cancel several previously scheduled 
regular meetings, thereby denying resident members the opportunity for 
participation in board business for several months following the election. 
Consequently, to avoid the potential for abuse, subsection (a) could be added to 
section 190.006(6), Florida Statutes, providing the following: “Boards shall meet 
no less than [ten] times per year, with no more than [sixty] days between 
meetings.”
99
 That simple change would eliminate the possibility that developer-
controlled boards could “freeze out” resident members for any significant period of 
time. 
The argument against mandating a minimum number of appropriately spaced 
meetings is that boards should have the discretion to establish their own meeting 
dates and times.
100
 That would be acceptable in an ideal world, where the best 
interests of the residents, who ultimately pay the bills, are kept at the forefront. 
Unfortunately, there is no such thing as an ideal world. Furthermore, not 
scheduling and keeping regular meetings deprives the residents from addressing the 
board in its entirety; although, the residents may contact individual board 
members.
101
 However, as previously stated, individual board members are 
prohibited from discussing board business amongst themselves outside of a public 
meeting.
102
 Therefore, the failure to schedule and hold regular meetings is a 
disservice to both the residents and the resident members of the board. 
VI.  VOTING CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS 
Section 112.3143(3)(b), Florida Statutes,
103
 which addresses voting conflicts of 
interest, could also be revised to better protect the interests of the district’s 
residents. The statute permits an officer affiliated with the developer to vote on 
matters that come before the board, even though the actions taken will inure to his 
 ________________________  
 98. See FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(b) (two weeks currently required in the statute). 
 99. See FLA. STAT. § 190.006(6). 
 100. See generally FLA. STAT. § 720.303(2). 
 101. FLA. STAT. § 720.303(1). 
 102. See FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (2012). 
 103. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(3)(b) (2013). “However, a commissioner of a community redevelopment 
agency created or designated pursuant to [section] 163.356 or [section] 163.357, or an officer of an independent 
special tax district elected on a one-acre, one-vote basis, is not prohibited from voting, when voting in said 
capacity.” (emphasis added). 
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 However, that vote is still clearly a conflict of interest, albeit a 
permissible one. But the statute does not draw the line between a vote that will 
inure to the officer’s benefit versus one that will harm the district in some 
manner.
105
 In other words, is a vote that will inure to an officer’s benefit, but will 
also harm the district, permissible? Apparently so.
106
 For example, a development 
includes not only land that can be developed for profit, but also land that cannot be 
developed, and is designated for the common use and enjoyment of all residents.
107
 
Those common areas may include roads, roadways, rights-of-way, community 
parks, and other common areas.
108
 
Property taxes must be paid on the common areas, and those common areas 
must also be maintained.
109
 The developer has that responsibility prior to turnover 
of the project to the residents.
110
 Thereafter, the district, or the respective 




With that in mind, what if a developer approached the developer-controlled 
board and asked the board for permission to transfer some of the common areas to 
the district prior to turnover? This action would benefit the developer in two 
ways.
112
 First, the developer would no longer have to pay assessments to the 
district;
113




However, the detriment to the district would be twofold. The district could no 
longer collect assessments from the developer on the transferred common areas, 
and the district would have to assume the maintenance of those common areas.
115
 
Both would be detrimental to the district and the residents, who would have to 




Another example of a permissible voting conflict of interest that could cause 
financial harm to a district would include the collection of unpaid assessments on 
land owned by the developer.
117
 A board has the authority to foreclose on any 
property for which assessments are not paid.
118
 But what if the developer failed to 
pay its share of the assessments on time? The developer-controlled board would 
obviously vote to not foreclose on the developer-owned property. That vote would 
 ________________________  
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See Flescher v. Oak Run Assocs., 111 So. 3d 929, 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 931. 
 110. See id. at 933. 
 111. FLA. STAT. § 720.303(1). 
 112. FLA. STAT. § 720.303(1); see also FLA. STAT. § 720.308(1)(b) (2007). 
 113. FLA. STAT. § 720.308(1)(b). 
 114. FLA. STAT. § 720.303(1). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See FLA. STAT. § 190.011(14) (2009). 
 118. FLA. STAT. § 190.026 (2007). 
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benefit the developer, and ultimately the board members who are owners of the 
development company, but the vote is allowable under the statute.
119
 However, as 
in the previous example, the vote would cause a financial detriment to the district 




A simple solution would be to amend section 112.3143(3)(b), Florida 
Statutes,
121
 as follows, in order to prohibit any allowable conflict of interest vote by 
a developer-controlled board that could cause financial harm to the district: 
Section 112.3143(3)(b). However, a commissioner of a community 
redevelopment agency created or designated pursuant to section 
163.356 or section 163.357, or an officer of an independent special 
tax district elected on a one-acre, one-vote basis, is not prohibited 
from voting, when voting in said capacity, except when the vote 
could knowingly result in financial harm to the community 
redevelopment agency created or designated pursuant to section 
163.356 or section 163.357, or an independent special tax district. 
(c) Any commissioner of a community redevelopment agency or an 
officer of an independent special tax district found to have 
knowingly voted on a matter that resulted in financial harm to the 
community redevelopment agency or the special tax district, 
respectively, shall be guilty of malfeasance within the meaning of 
section 7, art. IV of the State Constitution, and be subject to 
removal by the Governor. 
(d) A vacancy created by the removal of a commissioner of a 
community redevelopment agency or an officer of an independent 
special tax district elected on a one-acre, one-vote basis, as a 
result of violation of sub-section (c) above, shall be filled by a 
qualified elector of the community redevelopment agency or 
independent special tax district. 
That simple change would place the developer elected board members on notice 
that any actions that both harm the district and benefit the developer would be 
prohibited. Furthermore, any such vote would subject the officer to removal from 
office by the governor pursuant to article IV, section 7 of the Florida 
Constitution,
122




 ________________________  
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(3)(b) (2013). 
 122. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
 123. See Bruner v. Fla. Comm’n on Ethics, 384 So. 2d 1339, 1340 (Fla. 1980). 
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To further guard against such abuse by a developer-controlled board, the 
vacancy created by removal of the officer would be filled by a qualified elector of 
the district, not another developer elected board member. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Florida Legislature determined that since a developer was assuming most 
of the risks when developing property, it would allow obvious conflict of interest 
votes by developer-controlled boards.
124
 The Florida Supreme Court agreed.
125
 
However, the Legislature failed to allow for the possible financial harm that a 
developer-elected board could cause a district and the residents within its 
boundaries, by permitting conflict of interest votes that resulted in financial harm 
to the district and the residents.
126
 
Furthermore, the developer does not assume all the risks when a district is 
formed since it is shielded from liability by the district, which assumes many of the 
risks, while the developer reaps the benefits.
127
 That makes it much easier for the 




The 2013 Florida Legislative Session brought changes to chapter 112, Florida 
Statutes,  by amending some sections and adding others.
129
 The purpose for these 
changes was to expand and clarify the ethics rules for public officials in Florida.
130
 
The Florida Legislature also passed CS/HB 7119, which amended chapter 720, 
Florida Statutes, related to homeowners’ associations.
131
 Those changes 
implemented additional reporting requirements for both homeowners’ associations 
and their officers and directors.
132
 It also addressed record keeping requirements 




Such changes indicate that the Florida Legislature is willing and able to revise 
the way official business is conducted in Florida. Consequently, there is no reason 
to believe it cannot make changes to the way developer-controlled community 
development districts are managed in order to better protect the citizens subject to 
their control. The Florida Legislature created this problem, and the Florida 
Legislature can fix it.  
In order to do so, however, the Florida Legislature must be willing to fend off 
attacks by the various special interest groups that will surely object to any changes 
 ________________________  
 124. Frontier Acres, 384 So. 2d at 472. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(3)(b). 
 127. See FLA. STAT. § 720.303(2). 
 128. See FLA. STAT. § 720.303(1). 
 129. See generally FLA. STAT. § 112. 
 130. See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.311(1)–(6) (2013). 
 131. See generally FLA. STAT. § 720. 
 132. See FLA. STAT. § 720.303(7), (13). 
 133. FLA. STAT. § 720.303(4); FLA. STAT. § 720.307(2) (2013). 
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that would impair the ability developers have to do whatever they choose with 
districts they control. 
 
15
: The Potential for Abuse
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013
